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Constitutional Law-Attorney's Loyalty Fitness
Plaintiff-law students challenged, primarily on first and fourteenth amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds, New
York's system for screening bar applicants. New York statutes
and rules require generally that the defendants (appellate division of the state supreme court and, preliminarily, committees
on character and fitness) " ... be satisfied that [an applicant]
possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney . . . ." Specifically, however, the committees require affidavits from two acquaintances of the applicant and the latter's
completion of a questionnaire, followed by a personal interview. Finally, each applicant must swear or affirm that he will
support the constitutions of the United States and the state of
New York. Rule 9406 of the New York Civil Practice Law reflects these requirements in directing the committees not to
certify an applicant for admission " ... unless he shall furnish
satisfactory proof . . . that he believes in the form of the government of the United States and is loyal to such government." Two
questions in the applicant's questionnaire ask whether (a)
the- applicant had ever helped organize or had joined any organization known by him to advocate unlawful overthrow of
the United States or any state government, with specific intent
on the applicant's part to further such an objective, and (b)
whether the applicant could take the supportive loyalty oath conscientiously and without mental reservation. Plaintiffs attacked
this procedure as invalid on its face and as applied, not because
of any unjustifiable denial of bar admission but on the ground
that the screening system works a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of law students' free speech, belief, and association. The
three-judge United States District Court found certain minor
imperfections in the questionnaire, but otherwise sustained the
screening statutes and rules as valid. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, affirmed (5-4). The Court held (1) that
Rule 9406, as consistently and narrowly interpreted by the New
York judges and committees, imposed on plaintiffs no impermissible burden of proof or invalid scope of inquiry into their political beliefs, requiring no more than a willingness to take the constitutional oath in good faith; and (2) that the questionnaire inquiries into an applicant's organizational activity and scienter
are "precisely tailored to conform to the relevant decisions of this
Court." Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond, 401U.S.154 (1971).
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Clearly a state may require bar applicants to possess the
good "character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and
counsellor-at-law." 1 Presently every state, as well as the District
of Columbia, requires "good moral character" or something
comparable. 2 The United States Supreme Court requires of applicants for admission to its bar that "their private and professional characters shall appear to be good." 3 Also there is no remaining doubt that an applicant may constituti9nally be required to state his allegiance to the United States and state constitutions.4 The Court, however, has invalidated a number of
loyalty oaths going beyond a simple affirmation demanding,
in effect, complete freedom from subversive bel.ief, association, and activity. 5 In Wadmond there was little doubt of the
oath's validity per se. 6 The main question litigated in Wadmond was the validity of Rule 9406 7 and two related questions
on the required applicant questionnaire. 8 The Court conceded
that Rule 9406 on its face raised substantial constitutional ques1. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957).
The New Mexico Bar refused to permit an applicant to take the bar
examination on the grounds that the applicant had not shown "good
moral character." Mr. Justice Black, writing for the court which determined the applicant's former Communist Party membership insufffcient to show lack of good moral character, said, "A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in
a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process Clause or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [citations] A State
can require high standards of qualifications, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar;
but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." See also Note, The New
Mexico Bar Admission Loyalty Oath: A Study in Unconstitutionality;

9 NAT RES. J. 248 (1969).
.
2. See generally 5 1971 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DmECTORY
(103d ed. 1970).
3. U.S. SUP. CT. RuLE 5 (1).
4. Hosack v. Smiley, 390 U.S. 744 (1968); Knight v. Board of Regents, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
5. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6. "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of New
York, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of ... ,
according to the best of my ability." N.Y. CONST., art. XIII, § 1; N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAW§ 466 (McKinney 1968).
7. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAw AND RULES, RUle 9406 (McKinney 1963).
8. The defendants had already, both before and after commencement of this litigation, eliminated or revised certain questions to which
plaintiffs had originally raised objections. Other questions were ordered
revised or eliminated by the district court.
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tions both as to the burden of proof permissible under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and as to the permissible scope of inquiry into an applicant's political beliefs under the first and fourteenth. In Speiser v. RandaU9 it was held
as a matter of procedural due process that a state may not even
place on an applicant for tax exemption the burden of proving
that he has not engaged in criminal activity. The Court in
Wadmond concluded however that there was no true burden of
proof, in the sense of a burden persuasion, imposed upon the applicant, but only the lighter burden of going forward with the
evidence which could be satisfied by his answering two questions on the questionnaire.
In Elfbrandt v. Russell 10 , the Court declared that a statute
which, touches the protected rights of the first and fourth
amendments must be narrowly drawn. Legislative goals cannot
be pursued by means which broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties. NAACP v. Button 11 declared "the threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." The dangers of this "chilling effect" upon the
exercise of vital first amendment rights must be guarded against
by sensitive legislation which clearly informs as to what is being
proscribed. Without appearing to disturb these precedents
however, the Court in Wadmond, held the screening inquiries
proper. Accepting defendants' narrow construction, regardless
of the meaning that might have been given Rule 9406 and the key
questionnaire inquiries by the Court itself, the Court reasoned
that if the defendants are regarded as state courts, the United
States Supreme Court was bound by the defendants' construction;
and if the defendants are viewed as state administrative agencies
charged with enforcement and construction of the Rule, the defendants' interpretation is at least entitled to "respectful consideration."12
As urged in the dissents of both Mr. Justice Marshall and
9. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
10. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
11. 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
12. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Kingsley Int.
Pie. Corp. v. Regents of N.Y.U., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87,
96 ( 1935). The majority accepted the narrow construction of Rule
9406 offered by the defendants' (the Committees on Character and
Fitness and their members and two appellate divisions and their
judges). But see Justice Marshall's dissent where he argues that prior
to the Wadmond litigation it appears that defendants thought it was
their duty to make virtually unlimited inquiry into an applicant's as-
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Mr. Justice Black, this rationale appears to conflict with Bond v.
Floyd, 13 where the Court refused to allow a majority of state
legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly-elected
legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. The majority,
however, declared that "at the most, the Rule as authoritatively
interpreted . . . performs only the function of ascertaining that
an applicant is not one who swears to an oath proforma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to
the oath," 14 and that such inquiry falls into the area left permissible by Bond.
Plaintiffs challenged the questionnaire as requiring disclosure of acts and associations beyond the state's constitutionally
permissible scope of inquiry. Only two numbered questions 15
were in dispute:
26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or
become a member of any organization or group of persons
which, during the period of your membership or association, you
knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the
United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof
should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence, or
any unlawful means? - - If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below.
(b). If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you,
during the period of such membership or association, have the
specific intent to further the aims of such organization or group
of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the
United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof
by force, violence or any unlawful means?
27. (a) Is there any reason why you cannot take and subscribe to an oath of affirmation that you will support the constitutions of the United States and of the State of New York? If
there is, please explain.
(b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you
are, without any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States? - -

The Court refused plaintiffs' argument and declared that both
questions were legitimate inquiries.
The majority of the Court has recently been more restricsociational, political, and journalistic activities. See also Judge Motley's
dissenting opinion in the Wadmond litigation in the lower court, Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp.
117, 137-139 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
13. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
14. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154, 163 (1971).
15. The lower court had ordered all other questions revised or
eliminated and only two questions (both revised by the district court)
remained in dispute. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401U.S.154, 164 (1971).
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tive about the permissible scope and coverage of oath and investigative provisions. 16 This view is reflected in Baird v. State
Bar of Arizona11 and In Re Stolar,1 8 two bar admission denial
cases decided the same day as the principal case. In Baird and
Stolar, the Court refused to allow denials of admission to practice law for refusals to answer questions relating to applicants'
beliefs about government and their affiliations with organizations suspected of advocating unlawful overthrow, on the ground
that such denials contravene first amendment protections. In
Baird, Mt. Justice Black, writing for the majority with three
Justices concurring and one Justice concurring in the result, declared "[t]he First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or
punishing him solely because ... he holds certain beliefs." 19
When a state seeks to inquire about an individual's beliefs and
associations, a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. And
whatever justification may be offered, a state may not inquire
about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of
withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes. 20
Prima facie, the disputed provisions in Wadmond seem replete
with the same defects which were fatal to the questionnaires in
Baird and Stolar. Two differences, however, were apparently
decisive. The majority in Wadmond, unlike Baird and Stolar,
emphasized that no person before the Court had actually been
refused admission to the New York Bar. Secondly, defendants
in Wadmond proffered, in defense of New York's screening process, evidence of a restrictive interpretation and application of
the broadly-drawn admission criteria rather than an attempt to
16. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964);
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). See Brown
and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV.
480 (1953); Countryman, Loyalty Tests for Lawyers, 13 LAw. GUILD
REV. 149 (1953); Frankel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IowA L. REV. 153 (1951);
Koenigsberg and Stavis, Test Oaths: Henry VIII to the American Bar
Association, 11 LAw. GUILD REV. 111 (1951); Note, The New Mexico
Bar Admission Loyalty Oath: A Study in Unconstitutionality, 9 NAT.
REs. J. 248 (1969); Comment, Constitutional Law-Loyalty Oaths, 20
S. CAL. L. REV. 333 (1968); Comment, California's Application Forms for
Admission to Practice Law and the First Amendment, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 407 (1967).
17. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
18.
19.
20.

401 U.S. 23 (19'11).
401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
Ibid.
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justify the statutes on their face.
One may reasonably conclude that a state may escape invalidation of a statute which apparently exceeds permissible Bill of
Rights limits if the state shows that the statute does not operatively mean what it appears to say, but rather requires only an
allegiance to the Constitution, and secondly, that a state may
properly make inquiries to determine the oath affirmant's sincerity and good faith.
W. WADE BERRYiilLL

